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Abstract  
This essay theoretically investigates symmetric types of auctions and provides 
simulation for the different types of statistical distributions that bidders follow in order 
to determine the maximum bid, Expected revenue for the auctioneer, Expected 
payment by bidders, Expected utility of the bidders, probability that item is unallocated. 
In addition, the subject of interest of this paper are three types of auctions: FPA (first 
price auction, Dutch type, SPA (Second price auction, English auction, Vickrey 
auction), APA (all-pay auctions)  
Introduction  
 
Symmetric auctions are widely used in practice. These are types of auctions where 
bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bid is winning2. The payments are 
determined as an anonymous function of bids, (Deb &Pai 2016).Symmetric auctions 
are having rules, which are anonymous and non-discriminatory, which is why they are 
so popular in practice, despite the fact that they do not achieve seller’s revenue 
maximisation when buyers are heterogeneous. For instance, first price auctions(FPA) 
are more profitable than the second price auctions (SPA) in a case of risk averse 
buyers and when risk aversion coefficient is higher the difference is larger. So it is 
plausible that FPA is more profitable than SPA, (Klempeper 1999).Klemperer asserts 
that in second price or ascending bid auction, winner pays a price set by a runner-up 
(second best), and by revenue equivalence, must bid the expectation of this price in a 
first price auction. So the price is fixed in FPA and random but with the same mean in 
SPA. This means that the price is riskier in SPA. Therefore, risk averse seller prefers 
first-price auction to a second sealed-bid auction, and prefers the second price sealed-
bid auction to an ascending open auction.   
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Interactions between markets and institutions-The case of auctions  
McAfee and McMillan (1987), define auctions as market institutions with an explicit set 
of rules that are determining resource allocation and prices on a basis of bids from the 
market participants.  
On the other hand institutions are rules that define conditions by which market 
messages (offers, demands, and accepts) are being traded, and lead to allocation of 
resources and process, (Smith2001).If in the economy there exist 𝑛 agents , i.e. 𝑖 =
1,2, … 𝑛 and each of them chooses a message 𝜇𝑖 ,than the allocation of the resources 
𝑥𝑖 towards agent 𝑖 is defined as : 
Equation 1 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝜂(𝑚1. 𝑚2, … … . , 𝑚𝑖, … … … . , 𝑚𝑛) 
In the previous expression 𝜂 are the rules of allocation. Rules of allocation are 
institutionally defined rules. As an example one can take auctions and their rules. Let’s 
suppose that bidder 𝑖 outs a highest bid.  In such case following applies: 
Equation 2 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝜂(𝑚1 > 𝑚𝑖 > 𝑚𝑛) = 1, 𝑥𝑘 = 0; ∀𝑘 ≠ 1     
In this case 𝑚1 is the highest bid, and agent 𝑖 = 1 puts a highest bid. Henceforth, agent 
1 will win the auction. At first when agent 1 will make the bid, nobody knows who will 
win the lot(An item or set of items for sale in an auction). But the other on-site bidders 
know, that none of the other 𝑘  agents will not like to raise the bid, so that the rules of 
the institution tell us that 𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥𝑘 = 0.Some of the most successful internet 
auction houses such as eBay and Amazon are using second price auctions, by which 
bidder with highest bid will win the lot., but pays a price equal to the small increment 
(growth) on top of a second highest bid. On-site bidder can offer and “reserve price”, 
which is a maximum price and which is used to compete the others with prices. Some 
auction houses such as eBay have fixed closing time, while on Amazon closing time 
is continued as long as few minutes pass without bid (ten minutes on Amazon). In the 
eBay type of auction model there exist 𝑛 bidders , 𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛 . Minimal offer is 𝑚 
(reserve price) , and the least increment is 𝜁, which is assumed to be 
constant3.Reserve price should be higher than the current price , and the last reserve 
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price (“Hammer price”) established by the last bidder ,i.e. bidder cannot lower its last 
reserve price which was set, (Оckenfels&Roth 2003) .Highest reserve price is not 
revealed. Auction history shows the last price and shows the time when price was put 
by the bidder. Auctioneer can bid at any time 𝑡 ∈ [0,1] ∪ 1.Reaction time of other bid 
of second bidder 𝑡 , < 1.Earliest time of reaction is set with 𝑡𝑛 and 𝑡𝑛 > 𝑡
,, and is close 
to one , and so 𝑡 , < 𝑡𝑛 > 1. On the eBay auctions there are no dominant strategies. 
Bid caller (auctioneer), in this auctions can pay some value 𝑣𝑗, distributed by some 
known distribution4.Auctioneer who will win the auction with some price 𝑝, earn the 
difference between the price he likes to pay ,and the price that actually wins the auction 
𝑣𝑗 − 𝑝,auctioneer who does not won, does not gets zero. In the eBay auctions that are 
second price of the auctioneer type of auctions not with private value auctions 𝑣𝑗,  there 
are no dominant strategies 𝑣𝑗 > 𝑚 + 𝜁.The number of auctioneers is 2, 𝑖 = 2, and by 
assumption if 𝑖 > 2,other auctioneers do not auction. There is no dominant strategy 
for the player 𝑗 who has value 𝑣𝑗 > 𝑚 + 𝜁, which is best response for any strategy of 
the player 𝑗, which is the best response to any strategy of the player 𝑖. Let’s suppose 
that the strategy,𝑖, is to set minimal bid 𝑚 when 𝑡 = 0, i.e. at the beginning of the 
auction, and to bid furthermore always when there is highest bid, but if he is not the 
auctioneer with the highest bid than he will set bid 𝑏 > 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜁. Contrary to this strategy, 
best response of the player 𝑗 is not to bid at any time period,𝑡 < 1, and not to bid 𝑣𝑗 
when 𝑡 = 1. Result from this strategy for player𝑗, 𝑝(𝑣𝑗 − 𝑚 − 𝜁) > 0, which means that 
no other strategy when 𝑡 = 1cannot contribute to higher result to 𝑗 . But, if we assume 
that the strategy of the player 𝑖 is not to bid in any of the times offered, than the strategy 
of the player 𝑗 who answers the bid only when 𝑡 = 1, that will provide him  the expected 
result 𝑝(𝑣𝑗 − 𝑚) < 𝑣𝑗 − 𝑚, which is a result that 𝑗 could achieve from the strategies 
offered 𝑣𝑗 when 𝑡 = 0, or at any given period of time when 𝑡 < 1. Best strategy for the 
player 𝑖is 𝑝(𝑣𝑗 − 𝑚 − 𝜁) > 0, which is a strategy of player 𝑗,because best strategy of 𝑗 
was not to bid if 𝑡 ≠ 0. Consequently, this is a proof that there is no dominant strategy. 
In a standard auction model of the eBay institution, it has been specified minimal 
opening bid, but not the price, which is a seller’s reserve price. Seller can choose 
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public bid but also additional reserve price below which he cannot sell. In the previous 
example reserve price is lower so that the post-sale negotiation be avoided5. 
First price auction (sealed first bid auction strategically equivalent to Dutch 
auctions) 
In this auction scheme each buyer submits a bid 𝑏 ≥ 0 for the object. The bids are 
sealed, and no bidder has information about the bids of other opponents. The object 
is allocated to the bidder with the highest bid. Highest bidder pays the bid; other 
bidders pay nothing. Variance in the Dutch auctions is  
For the Dutch type of auctions variance of price is: 
Equation 3 
𝜎𝑝𝑑
2 = ∫(𝑝𝑑 − ?̅?𝑑)
2𝑑𝑝(𝑣) = ∫ (
𝑛 − 1
𝑛
𝑣 −
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 + 1
)
2
𝑛𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣
1
0
= ∫
𝑛2 − 1
𝑛2
𝑣 −
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 + 1)
(𝑛 + 1)2
𝑛𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣 =
1
0
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 + 1)
𝑛2
𝑣
−
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 + 1)
(𝑛 + 1)2
𝑛𝑣𝑛−1|0
1 =
𝑛 − 1 − 𝑛2(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛2
𝑛 + 1
=
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 + 1)(1 − 𝑛)
𝑛2(𝑛 + 1)
=
(𝑛 − 1)(1 − 𝑛)
𝑛2
 
In the Dutch model of auction , buyers gain is 𝑣 − 𝑝 = 𝑣 − [
𝑛−1
𝑛
] 𝑣 =
𝑣
𝑛
, where 𝑣 is the 
highest drawn value, range of possible gains is from 0 to 
1
𝑛
 .While, in the English type 
of auction gain could vary from 0 to 1, Vickrey (1961) 
 
 
 
Vickrey type of auction (sealed-bid) 
This auction scheme is different in the one presented in (Vickrey1961), which is used 
by Google and Yahoo in their on-line advertisement programs. Vickrey (1961) auction 
scheme, is different from the type of scheme of proxy auctions on eBay, by the fact 
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that bids are not closed , i.e. current highest bid6,is always public. In Vickrey type of 
auction, bidders submit their bids sealed, without knowing other members in the 
auction bids, and in this type of auction highest bid wins, but the price paid is second 
highest bid. This result is Pareto optimal. This auction is efficient because the winner 
is the auctioneer for whom the lot has highest value. Achievement of Pareto optimal 
result on imperfect markets is difficult. Market imperfection in Vickrey model is in the 
fact that buyers and sellers are very few in number to ignore consequences of their 
actions on price but on the other hand there are not enough participants in the market 
in overt or tacit (collusions) market actions. Vickrey in his model describes one 
marketing agency, through which all sales of goods and procurements must be done. 
If we imagine homogenous rectangular distribution of the auction in limits 0 to 1, and 
even though number of players is 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, from which for all of them there exist 
corresponding value in the distribution 𝑣𝑖and are biding one price, while probability for 
first 𝑛 − 1 players to draw corresponding value for them is [0, 𝑣] while the n-thplayer 
would draw corresponding value between [𝑣, 𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣] = 𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣, this value is from the 
value 𝑑𝑝1(𝑣) = 𝑛𝑣
𝑛−1. Price of every bid is given as 𝑝𝑑 = (
𝑛−1
𝑛
) 𝑣 .Expected price in 
this case is given with the following expression : 
Equation 4 
?̅?𝑑 = ∫ 𝑝𝑑𝑝1(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
1
0
= ∫ (
𝑛−1
𝑛
) 𝑣
1
0
𝑛𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣 =
(𝑛−1)(𝑣𝑛𝑣𝑛−1)
𝑛
𝑑𝑣 =
𝑛−1
𝑛+1
                          
Previous case is when one has definite integral , i.e. distribution goes from 0 to 1, 
and the result applies if 𝑛 > −1, if there is unlimited distribution than the result is : 
Equation 5 
?̅?𝑑 = ∫ 𝑝𝑑𝑝1(𝑐)𝑑𝑣 = ∫
(𝑛−1)(𝑣𝑛𝑣𝑛−1)
𝑛
𝑑𝑣 =
(𝑛−1)𝑛
𝑛
∫ 𝑣𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣 =
(𝑛−1)𝑛
𝑛
∫ 𝑣𝑛𝑑𝑣 =
(𝑛−1)𝑛
𝑛
𝑣𝑛+1
𝑛+1
+ 𝐶 =    
(𝑛−1)∗𝑣𝑛+1
𝑛+1
+ 𝐶    
 
Probability that the second best price will be realized is
𝑛
𝑛+1
 , and the probability that 
this price is in the interval between [𝑣, 𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣] = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝑣𝑛−2(1 − 𝑣)𝑑𝑣, meaning 
that the average price is: 
                                                          
6Current highest bid is equal to the second best bid plus increment change, i.e. 𝑚 + 𝜁 
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Equation 6 
?̅?𝑐 = ∫ 𝑣𝑑𝑝2(𝑣) = ∫ 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)(𝑣
𝑛−1 − 𝑣𝑛)𝑑𝑣 = (𝑛 − 1) −
𝑛(𝑛−1)
𝑛+1
=
𝑛−1
𝑛+1
1
0
                     
Again expected value of the bidders is the expected value of the excess 
1
𝑛+1
,and the  
value of lot won by the successful bidder 
𝑛
𝑛+1
.This applies for progressive type of 
auctions 7,and for Dutch auctions 8.But the price variance is different in both types of 
auctions .For the SPA (second price auction theory) variance is  
Equation 7 
𝜎𝑐𝑑
2 = ∫ (𝑣 −
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 + 1
)
2
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)(𝑣𝑛−2 −
1
0
𝑣𝑛−1)𝑑𝑣
= (𝑣 −
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 + 1
)
2
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)(𝑣𝑛−2 − 𝑣𝑛−1)|0
1 = (1 −
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 + 1
)
2
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
= (1 − 2
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 + 1
)
2
𝑛(𝑛 − 1) = (1 − 2
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 + 1
+
𝑛2 − 2𝑛 + 1
𝑛2 + 1
) 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
=
[2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1)2 + 𝑛22(𝑛 + 1) − 4𝑛(𝑛 + 1) + 2(𝑛 + 1)]𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1)2
=
𝑛 + 2[(𝑛 + 1)2 + 𝑛2 − 2𝑛 + 1]𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
(𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)2
=
(𝑛 + 2)𝑛(𝑛 − 1)[(𝑛 + 1)2 − (𝑛 − 1)2]
(𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)2
=
2(𝑛 − 1)
(𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)2
 
 
Variance in the gain is even larger from Dutch to English model of auction.Revenue 
equivalence theorem is a central topic in the auction theory. This theory confirms that 
if there are 𝑛 risk neutral agents, that do independent and personal evaluation of some 
auction good , and valuation follows cumulative distribution 𝐹(𝑣), which is ascending 
probability distribution of a continuous set of choices (𝑣, ?̅?) .Than every auction 
mechanism (every institution auction), in which lot will be allocated towards the agent 
for which it has highest value ?̅?, and every agent with a valuation  of good 𝑣 has utility 
0,generates exact same revenue, which lead every bidder to make the same payment. 
Mechanism of lot allocation taken into consideration here is following: expected value 
                                                          
7English auctions are such type where it is begun with lowest (reserve prices) and it is going to higher price. 
English auctions are of open type.   
8Dutch type of auction. is a type of auction, that begins with highest bid that decreases until some auctioneer does 
accept the price, or accepts proposed reserve price. 
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of lot for the agent 𝑖 is𝑢𝑖(?̅?) , while the probability that the agent 𝑖 will win the auction 
is 𝑃𝑖(?̅?), in the equilibrium of the auction (when the lot is saled), and afterwards it 
follows the agents strategy ?̅?, this strategy is given by a following expression: 
Equation 8 
𝑢𝑖(?̅?) = ?̅?𝑃𝑖(?̅?) − 𝐸(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ?̅?𝑖)                                                                                   
This means that the utility of agent  , is dependent on the average value by which he 
values lot, which is multiplied with the probability  that he will win the auction minus 
the average value of agents 𝑖 payment , which he will do for the selected lot. In the 
equilibrium: 
Equation 9 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣) ≥  𝑢𝑖(?̅?) + (𝑣 − ?̅?)𝑃𝑖(?̅?)                                                                                        
𝑣 type agent , values the lot with 𝑣 − ?̅?, more than agents ?̅? lot valuation. Inequality 
applies because the deviation must be non-profit , i.e. 𝑣 − ?̅? ≥ 0,here one it can be 
written that 
Equation 10 
?̅? = 𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣                                                                                                                     
Where 𝑑𝑣 is some marginal value, and ?̅? value is larger than 𝑣 for some marginal 
value. If in the previous expression 𝑢𝑖(𝑣) ≥  𝑢𝑖(?̅?) + (𝑣 − ?̅?)𝑃𝑖(?̅?) one replaces ?̅? with 
?̅? = 𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣 , one could get : 
Equation 11 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣) ≥  𝑢𝑖(𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣) + (𝑣 − 𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣)𝑃𝑖(𝑣 + 𝑑𝑣)  
With the rearrangement one can get: 
Equation 12 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣) ≥  𝑢𝑖(𝑣) + 𝑑𝑣𝑃𝑖(𝑣)                                                                                                   
Value of the utility for the agent 𝑖 for 𝑣valuation, one can get as a sum of utility 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣),plus  the sum from probability that lot 𝑥 will be allocated to him, which is equal 
to 𝑃𝑖(?̅?), ie.: 
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Equation 13 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑣) + ∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
𝑣𝑖
𝑣
                                                                                                
Because there are two possible outcomes of the auction, agent wins the lot and agent 
does not win the lot, (0,1), i.e. as it is said in the theorem at the beginning(𝑣, ?̅?) , 
meaning that the agent of type 𝑣 will never won the game , and his utility will be zero 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣) = 0. Furthermore, every player has equal probability that will win the lot in the 
two type of auctions (English and Dutch)𝑃𝑖(𝑣𝑖).From the equation, 𝑢𝑖(?̅?) = ?̅?𝑃𝑖(?̅?) −
𝐸(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ?̅?𝑖)   , for the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ  agent we have   : 
Equation 14 
𝑢𝑖(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣𝑖𝑃𝑖(𝑣𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑖)                                                    
This means that expected payoff in the two mechanisms (𝑣, ?̅?) , is equal and amounts 
to 𝐸(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑖). 
Symmetric model case  
This case applies when coefficient of risk aversion is zero. Whether one chooses 
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)9,or Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)10,if 
the risk aversion coefficients are zero, and reservation price (𝑟 = 0) revenue  
equivalence holds. In this case expected revenue 𝐸(𝑅),from the auctionto the 
auctioneer is the same in the First price auction (Dutch auction) and in the Second 
price auction (English auction, Vickrey type of auction). So in the case where revenue 
equivalence holds (risk neutral case), utility to the bidders is: 
Equation 15 
𝑈(𝑐) = 𝑐 
In the previous expression 𝑐 represents consumption, and in the risk neutral case such 
as this bid functions (symmetric equilibrium bid functions) are : 
Equation 16 
𝑏(𝑣) = (
𝑛 − 1
𝑛
) 𝑣 
                                                          
9This is also known as Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. See in(Carl&Blume1994) 
10This is also known as Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. 
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In the case of a pure strategy equilibrium, where player 1 (bidder) reveals, bidder’s 
valuation is common knowledge, so the rival bidders can anticipate bid of player 1. 
This bid will be denoted as  𝑣0 > 0, unless 𝑣1 = 0 .Best response of the closest rival 
(i-th bidder) top the bidder 1  rival will be to bid as in an auction with 𝑛 − 1 bidders, and 
a common knowledge reserve price 𝑏0which will be equal to 𝑣011.The equilibrium 
bidding strategy with n − 1 bidders and a reservation price of 𝑏0and reservation value 
𝑣 > 𝑏0, is given as
12: 
Equation 17 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 −
1
𝐹𝑛−1(𝑣)
∫ 𝐹𝑛−1(𝑠)
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑠 
𝑏0 < 𝑣 < 1 or zero otherwise. In the previous integral s is a signal; 
In the previous expression 𝑏(𝑣𝑖) represents buyers I valuation of the object bid that 
wins the object and in such a case 𝑣𝑖 represents bidders i reservation value. And the 
bidding strategy is strictly increasing function of his reservation value,𝑣 represents the 
private values of the bidders ,𝑥 represents private information that buyer 𝑖 has obtained 
about the objective monetary valuation of the object𝐹𝑛−1(𝑥) is buyers probability of 
winning the lot , while 𝐹𝑛−1(𝑣) represents a highest bid. In such a situation winning bid 
in general is given as:𝑏(𝑣) = 𝑝(𝑣)/𝐹𝑛−1(𝑣).In the previous expression 𝑝(𝑣) represents 
expected payment which is equal to:𝑝(𝑣) = 𝑣𝐹𝑛−1(𝑣) − ∫ 𝐹𝑛−1(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑣
𝑣∗
. If 𝑣∗ = 𝑣  than 
in FPA and SPA, expected revenue is the same. That is only the case if reservation 
price is zero. Otherwise the seller will always announce reservation price strictly 
greater than his personal valuation i.e. 𝑣∗ > 𝑣,so :𝑣∗ = 𝑣0 + 1 −
𝐹(𝑣∗)
𝐹′(𝑣∗)
.Where 𝑣∗ is a 
minimum auction  reservation value and below this reservation value is not worthwhile 
bidding, 𝐹(𝑣∗) is a probability function that bidder with valuation 𝑣∗ , will win the lot, and 
𝐹′(𝑣∗) is a first derivative of the probability function. By rewriting and simplifying, we 
will find bidding function first, we will solve the integral: 
                                                          
11See (Pardina-Martinez 2006).  
12See (Riley & Samuelson 1981) 
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Equation 18 
∫ 𝐹𝑛−1(𝑠)
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑠 = ∫ 𝑠𝑛−1
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑠 
 Since signal s=v, Indefinite integral is ∫ 𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣 =
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
+ 𝐶.So to solve definite integral 
one may apply: 
Equation 19 
(
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
) |(𝑣 = 𝑣) =
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
 and (
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
) |(𝑣 = 𝑟) =
𝑟𝑛
𝑛
 
In general solution to the definite integral is : 
Equation 20 
∫
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑣 =
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
−
𝑟𝑛
𝑛
 
Bidding function in the risk averse case where a=0, and r is set is given as: 
Equation 21 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 −
1
𝑣𝑛−1
∗ [
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
−
𝑟𝑛
𝑛
] 
Or in general case for non-uniform distributions bidding function in FPA according to 
Krishna (2010) is given as: 
Equation 22 
𝛽(𝑣) = 𝑥 − ∫
𝐹(𝑦)
𝐹(𝑥)
𝑑𝑦
𝑣
0
 
And 𝐹(𝑦) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑥) (F(x) is a CDF of a function ), x signal are drawn from private 
values distribution v so 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖e                                                                                               
 Now in the CRRA case, RRA coefficient can take values between zero and 1, utility 
is given as (𝑐) = 𝑐1−𝑎 , where𝑎 is the coefficient of RRA and 𝑎 ∈ (0,1). Than the Nash-
equilibrium bidding functions will have the following form: 
Equation 23 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 −
1
𝐹
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑣)
∫ 𝐹
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑠)
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑠 
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And 𝑏0 < 𝑣 < 1 or zero otherwise.  
One general Nash equilibrium biddingstrategy (CRRA case and where r=0) in FPA is 
given as: 
Equation 24 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) =
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 − 1 + 𝑎
(𝑣𝑖) 
And where r>0 i.e. auction is set with the reserve price bidding function is given as:  
 
Equation 25 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 −
1
𝐹
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑣)
∫ 𝐹
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑠)
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑠 
To solve this we find the indefinite integral solution(F(v)=v) which is : 
Equation 26 
∫ 𝑣
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
−𝑎+1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
(𝑎 − 1) + 𝐶 
Namely if 𝑛 =
𝑛−1
1−𝑎
 than ∫ 𝑣𝑛𝑑𝑣 =
𝑣𝑛+1
𝑛+1
𝑑𝑣 + 𝐶; 𝑛 ≠ −1 
Equation 27 
∫ 𝑣𝑛𝑑𝑣 =
𝑣
𝑛−1
1−𝑎+1
𝑛 − 1
1 − 𝑎 + 1
+ 𝐶 =
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) + 𝐶 
Now to evaluate integral at the endpoints  
Equation 28 
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1)|(𝑣 = 𝑣) =
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) 
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1)|(𝑣 = 𝑟) =
𝑟
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) 
So ∫ 𝑣
𝑛−1
1−𝑎
𝑣
𝑟
𝑑𝑣 =
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎−𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) −
𝑟
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎−𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) 
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So the general bid function in this case when a>0 and r>0 is given s: 
Equation 29 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 −
1
𝐹
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑣)
∗ [
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) −
𝑟
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1)] 
If the coefficient of risk aversion is CARA (Constant absolute risk aversion),ie. 𝑢(𝑐) =
1 − 𝑒−𝑎𝑐, where 𝑎 > 0 , than the bidding function is given as: 
Equation 30 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 +
1
𝑎
ln (1 −
𝑒−𝑎𝑣
𝐹𝑛−1(𝑣)
∫ [𝐹(𝑎−1𝑙𝑛𝑤]𝑁−1𝑑𝑤
𝑒𝑎𝑣
𝑒𝑎𝑟
 
Or when reserve price and absolute coefficient of risk aversion is set: 
Equation 31 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣 +
1
𝑎
ln (1 −
𝑒−𝑎𝑣
𝑣𝑛−1
∗
1
2𝑎
∗ (𝑒2𝑎𝑣 − 𝑒2𝑎𝑟) ∗ log(𝑣)𝑛−1) 
Where w presents wealth of the bidder. Approximately wealth is approximated by his 
valuation of the object which is subject to biding at the auction.  
All-pay auctions  
In all –pay auctions every bidder pays their bid whether they win or not. In all pay 
auctions Nash-equilibria (in the case of risk neutrality) mixing strategies of the bidders 
means that expected sellers revenue is equal to the common value of the prize13,are 
approximately given by the expression: 
Equation 32 
𝐹(𝑏) = (
𝑏
100
)
1
𝑛−1
 
Previous expression is valid for all b, if 0 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 100 ,in that expression F(b) also 
denotes c.d.f of the equilibrium bidding strategy ; see (Gneezy&Smorodinsky 2006) 
                                                          
13See Baye et all (1996) 
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In general, in risk neutral case and there is no reserve price set bidding function for 
All-pay auctions is given as: 
Equation 33 
𝑏(𝑎𝑙𝑙−𝑝𝑎𝑦) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 [(
𝑛 − 1
𝑛
) ∗ 𝑣] 
Or 𝑏(𝑎𝑙𝑙−𝑝𝑎𝑦) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 ∗ 𝛽(𝑣) where 𝛽(𝑣) denotes FPA bid-First price auction bid. If the 
reserve price is set i.e. r>0 and bidders are risk neutral a=0 than the bidding function 
in APA auctions is given as: 
Equation 34 
𝑏(𝑎𝑙𝑙−𝑝𝑎𝑦,𝑟>0) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 ∗ 𝑣 − ∫ 𝑣𝑛−1𝑑𝑣
𝑣
𝑟
 
i.e.   
 
Equation 35 
𝑏(𝑎𝑙𝑙−𝑝𝑎𝑦,𝑟>0) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 ∗ 𝑣 − [
𝑣𝑛
𝑛
−
𝑟𝑛
𝑛
] 
in the case where CRRA coefficient (𝑎)is being set bid function in APA auctions takes 
the following form: 
Equation 36 
𝑏(𝑎𝑙𝑙−𝑝𝑎𝑦,𝑟>0) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 ∗ [
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 − 1 + 𝑎
(𝑣𝑖)] 
 
If r>0 and a>0 i.e. there is RRA coefficient set and reserve price at the same 
Equation 37 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 ∗ [𝑣 −
1
𝐹
𝑛−1
1−𝑎(𝑣)
∗ [
𝑣
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1) −
𝑟
𝑎−𝑛
𝑎−1
(𝑎 − 𝑛)
∗ (𝑎 − 1)]] 
In CARA case  
14 
 
Equation 38 
𝑏(𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣
𝑛−1 ∗ [𝑣 +
1
𝑎
ln (1 −
𝑒−𝑎𝑣
𝑣𝑛−1
∗
1
2𝑎
∗ (𝑒2𝑎𝑣 − 𝑒2𝑎𝑟) ∗ log(𝑣)𝑛−1)] 
In general in the previous case with risk averse bidders , bidding functions are 
approximations the problem of optimization is as follows (according to the software 
creator Richard M.Katzwer),consider an all pay auction where n bidders draw IPV from 
some distribution with cdf on [𝑣𝑙, 𝑣ℎ].And let 𝛽: [𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣ℎ] → ℝ denote the symmetric Nash 
bid function. Bidders are risk averse with utility index u: ℝ+ → ℝ and initial wealth W. 
A bidder tries to maximize: 
Equation 39 
max
𝑏
    𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑣 − 𝑏)[𝐹(𝛽−1(𝑏)]𝑛−1 + 𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑏)(1 − [𝐹(𝛽−1(𝑏)]𝑛−1) 
The First order necessary condition (FONC)here is given as: 
Equation 40 
0 = 𝑢′(𝑊 + 𝑣 − 𝑏)[𝐹(𝛽−1(𝑏)]𝑛−1
+ 𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑛 − 1)[𝐹(𝛽−1(𝑏)]𝑛−2𝐹′(𝛽−1(𝑏))
1
𝛽′(𝛽−1(𝑏))
− 𝑢′(𝑊 − 𝑏)(1 − [𝐹(𝛽−1(𝑏)]𝑛−1) − 𝑢(𝑊
− 𝑏)(1 − [𝐹(𝛽−1(𝑏)]𝑛−2)𝐹′(𝛽−1(𝑏))
1
𝛽′(𝛽−1(𝑏))
 
Or since 𝛽−1(𝑏) = 𝑣 
0 = 𝑢′(𝑊 + 𝑣 − 𝑏)[𝐹(𝑣)]𝑛−1 + 𝑢(𝑊 + 𝑣 − 𝑏)(𝑛 − 1)[𝐹(𝑣)]𝑛−2𝐹′(𝑣)
1
𝛽′(𝑣)
− 𝑢′(𝑊 − 𝑏)(1 − [𝐹(𝑣)]𝑛−1) − 𝑢(𝑊 − 𝑏)(1 − [𝐹(𝑣)]𝑛−2)𝐹′(𝑣)
1
𝛽′(𝑣)
 
This is a complicated ODE to solve. 
 
Expected revenue (expected payoffs in auctions) 
In the first price auctions expected revenue for the auctioneer for every bid is given as 
expected payment multiplied by the number of bidders n, i.e.: 
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Equation 41 
E(𝑝, 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) = (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
(𝑏𝑖)
𝑛−1
(
𝑛
𝑛 − 1)
𝑛−1 
𝐸(𝑝, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) is the expected payoff , where 𝑣𝑖 are independent private values, and 
revenue is given as: 
Equation 42 
E(𝑅, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) = E(𝑝, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) ∗ 𝑁 
When CRRA coefficient is being set i.e. when bidders are not risk neutral the 
corresponding expected payoffs (and corresponding revenue) of the bidders are given 
as: 
Equation 43 
E(𝑅, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣𝑖 ∗
(𝑏𝑖)
𝑛−1
(
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 − 1 + 𝑎)
𝑛−1 
Where 𝑎 is CRRA coefficient in general when bids for the corresponding probabilities 
are known (calculated) the expected payoffs (expected revenues for every bidder) are 
given as: 
Equation 44 
E(𝑅, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑣𝑖) = 𝑣𝑖 ∗
(𝑏𝑖)
𝑛−1
𝛼𝑛−1
 
In the previous expression 𝛼 = (
𝑛−1
𝑛−1+𝑎
) =
𝑏𝑖
𝑣𝑖
 this is because 𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑣𝑖.This is true also 
when reserve prices is set and coefficient of risk aversion. In the Second price auctions 
(SPA) the CDF of the revenue functions is calculated as14: 
Equation 45 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒(𝑆𝑃𝐴,𝑟=0,𝑎∈ℝ+)  = 𝐹(𝑦)
𝑛 + 𝑛𝐹(𝑦)𝑛−1(1 − 𝐹(𝑦)) 
= 𝑛𝐹(𝑦)𝑛−1 − (𝑛 − 1)𝐹(𝑦)𝑛 
                                                          
14See Kunimoto (2008) 
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When reserve price is set in SPA auction, revenue function below reserve price looks 
like this: 
Equation 46 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒(𝑆𝑃𝐴,𝑟∈ℝ,𝑎∈ℝ+)  = 𝑟 ∗ 𝑟
𝑛−1 + 𝐹(𝑦)𝑛 + 𝑛𝐹(𝑦)𝑛−1(1 − 𝐹(𝑦)) 
= 𝑟 ∗ 𝑟𝑛−1 + 𝑛𝐹(𝑦)𝑛−1 − (𝑛 − 1)𝐹(𝑦)𝑛 
While when independent private values exceed reserve price the functional form of 
revenue CDF looks same as in the case with no reserve price.  
In all pay auctions in general case expected payoffs of the bidders are given as  
Equation 47 
𝐸(𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑃𝐴) = ∫ 𝛽(𝑣)𝑑𝐹 
Expected revenue in APA is given as: 
Equation 48 
𝐸(𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐴𝑃𝐴) = 𝑛 ∗ ∫ 𝛽(𝑣)𝑑𝐹 
From the revenue one need to find the private values function first and that is : 
Equation 49 
𝑣 = (
𝛽(𝑣)
(
2
3)
)
(
1
3)
 
Results from auction solver  
Next, here are presented the results obtained by use of auction solver. Richard 
M.Katzwer wrote this software. In the First table, we present the results obtained for 
the risk neutral case and in the second Table, we provide results for the case of risk 
neutral bidders15.  
 
                                                          
15 CRRA and CARA are being used as measures of neutrality or aversity of bidders.  
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Table 1 Risk neutral bidders, with reservation price zero, number of biiders=3 
Risk neutral case CRRA=0 ;CARA=0 and reservation price=0; number of bidders n=3  
Type of private 
values 
distribution 
Auction type 
maximum 
bid (right 
endpoint of 
bid 
distribution 
b_bar 
Expected 
revenue for 
the 
auctioneer 
(E[R] = E[m] 
* N) 
Expected 
payment by 
bidders 
E[m] 
Expected 
utility to 
bidders 
E[u 
probability 
item is 
unallocated 
(all bids 
below 
reserve) P0 
Standard 
normal 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6224938 0.4523084 0.1507695 0.0850927 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4523084 0.1507695 0.0850927 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6224938 0.4527079 0.1509026   
 
Log-Normal 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6603175 0.5370631 0.1790210 0.0616273 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5370629 0.1790210 0.0616273 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6603175 0.5373221 0.1791074   
Beta 
distribution  
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7735836 0.5000000 0.1666667 0.0824786 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5000000 0.1666667 0.0824786 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6666667 0.5004156 0.1668052   
Uniform 
distribution  
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6666667 0.5000000 0.1666667 0.0833333 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5000000 0.1666667 0.0833333 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6666667 0.5004156 0.1668052   
Triangular 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6166667 0.5000001 0.1666667 0.0583353 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5000000 0.1666667 0.0583353 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6166667 0.5002357 0.1667452   
Kumaraswamy 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6603175 0.5370631 0.1790210 0.0616273 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5370629 0.1790210 0.0616273 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6603175 0.5373221 0.1791074   
18 
 
Gamma 
distribution  
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.3949790       0.2104864 0.0701621 0.0922463 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000       0.2104868 0.0701623 NaN 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.3949790 0.2109960 0.0703320   
Weibull 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.5793264 0.4023042 0.1341014 0.0885111 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4023042 0.1341014 0.0885111 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.5793264 0.4027036 0.1342345   
Power 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.5000000 0.3000000 0.1000000 0.1000000 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.3000001 0.1000000 NaN 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.5000000 0.3005919 0.1001973   
Reverse power 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.8332238 0.7001114 0.2333705 2.1952248 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.6999999 0.2333333 Infinity 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.8332238 0.7012168 0.2337389   
Exponential 
distribution 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6237960 0.4502952 0.1500984 0.0867504 0.0000000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4502952 0.15009840 0.0867504 0.0000000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6237960 0.4507058 0.1502353   
 
 
Next, in Table 2 are presented the results in the risk averse bidders case. 
Table 2 Risk averse bidders (CRRA=4.0,CARA=4.0), with reservation price 
0.4,number of bidders=3 
Risk averse  case CRRA=0.4 ;CARA=4.0 and reservation price=0.4; number of bidders n=3  
Type of private 
values 
distribution 
Auction type 
maximum 
bid (right 
endpoint 
of bid 
distribution 
b_bar 
Expected 
revenue 
for the 
auctioneer 
(E[R] = 
E[m] * N) 
Expected 
payment by 
bidders 
E[m] 
Expected 
utility to 
bidders 
E[u 
probability 
item is 
unallocated 
(all bids 
below 
reserve) P0 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.7346317 0.5233480       0.1744493 0.1028037 0.0943964 
19 
 
Standard normal  
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4798612       0.1599537 0.1131171 0.0943964 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.7346317 0.0819876 0.0273292   
Standard normal 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.7263772 0.5102678 0.1700893 0.1534737 0.0943964 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4798612 0.1599537 0.1534737 0.0943964 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.7263772 0.0756754 0.0252251   
Log normal  
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.8649665 0.7540914 0.2513638 0.0828988 0.0002989 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.7077322 0.2359107 0.0966421 0.0002989 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.8649665 0.1718317 0.0572772   
Log normal 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type 
0.8384763 0.7290578 0.2430193 0.1297647 0.0002989 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.7077322 0.2359107 0.1297647 0.0002989 
APA(all-pay auctions) 0.8384763 0.1559933 0.0519978   
Beta 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7735836 0.5761506 0.1920502 0.1036646 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1156296 0.0640000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7735836 0.1036405 0.0345468   
Beta 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7598812 0.5603228 0.1867743 0.1567281 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1567281 0.0640000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7598812 0.0952758 0.0317586   
 
Uniform 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7735836 0.5761506 0.1920502 0.1042956 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1163464 0.0640000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7735836 0.1036405 0.0345468   
 
Uniform 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7598812 0.5603228 0.1867743 0.1576778 0.0640000 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5256000 0.1752000 0.1576778 0.0640000 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7598812 0.0952758 0.0317586   
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Triangular 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6901554 0.5442205 0.1814068 0.0892794 0.0327680 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5077239 0.1692413 0.0997395 0.0327680 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6901554 0.0679635 0.0226545   
 
Triangular 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6722348 0.5252554 0.1750851 0.1349865 0.0327680 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5077239 0.1692413 0.1349865 0.0327680 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.6722348 0.0584859 0.0194953   
 
Kumaraswamy 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7372686 0.5892777 0.1964259 0.0925610 0.0255160 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5456206 0.1818735 0.1046092 0.0255160 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7372686 0.0912166 0.0304055   
 
Kumaraswamy 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7165197 0.5682720 0.1894240 0.1420239 0.0255160 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.5456206 0.1818735 0.1420239 0.0255160 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.7165197 0.0799332 0.0266444   
 
Gamma 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.5756602 0.2727609 0.0909203 0.0719515 0.4180305 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.2592612 0.0864204 0.0748882 0.4180305 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.5756602 0.0203123 0.0067708   
 
Gamma 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.5922903 0.2713597 0.0904532 0.1018825 0.4156601 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.2593647 0.0864549 0.1018825 0.4156601 
APA(all-pay auctions)  0.5922903 0.0208872 0.0069624   
 
Weibull 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7011976 0.4704638 0.1568213 0.1001409 0.1418659 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4335800 0.1445267 0.1086913 0.1418659 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7011976 0.0651847 0.0217282 
  
 
Weibull 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6992714 0.4607301 0.1535767 0.1473960 0.1418659 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4335800 0.1445267 0.1473960 0.1418659 
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 FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6992714 0.0610630 0.0203543   
 
Power 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6575730 0.3854263 0.1284754 0.0932573 0.2529822 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.3578528 0.1192843 0.0992482 0.2529822 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6575730 0.0460285 0.0153428   
 
Power 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6666767 0.3811101 0.1270367 0.1344171 0.2529822 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.3578528 0.1192843 0.1344171 0.2529822 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.6666767 0.0451887 0.0150629   
 
Reverse Power 
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.9139690 0.7795748 0.2598583 1.8465012 0.0114520 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.7123353 0.2374451 Infinity 0.0114520 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.9139690 0.2064959 0.0688320   
 
Reverse Power 
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.8877422 0.7553769 0.2517923 2.9094572 0.0114520 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.7123353 0.2374451 Infinity 0.0114520 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.8877422 0.1904224 0.0634741   
 
Exponential  
(CRRA=0.4,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7384851 0.5237630 0.1745877 0.1034777 0.0977777 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4796241 0.1598747 0.1138245 0.0977777 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7384851 0.0836569 0.0278856   
 
Exponential  
(CARA=4.0,r=0.
4) 
 
 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7305809 0.5111237 0.1703746 0.1543483 0.0977777 
SPA(Second price 
auction, English auction, 
Vickrey auction) 
1.0000000 0.4796241 0.1598747 0.1543483 0.0977777 
FPA(first price auction , 
Dutch type  
0.7305809 0.0775855 0.0258618   
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Conclusion 
 
Hugo Sonnenschein, in his 1983 inaugural Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture, argued 
that is very important to understand how incentives work, i.e. how to create institutional 
arrangements that induce individuals to behave in certain way so that certain outcome 
prevails. In 1990s and later, economists have been recognized to the design of several 
auction like mechanisms such as: US FCC spectrum auctions, 3G auctions in Europe, 
the allocation of property rights on land at the airports, etc. So, the market design, or 
market architecture depends on a game theory, in particular games of incomplete 
information, but most important insights come from auction theory, Menezes, Flavio, 
M. , Monteiro ,Paulo K.,(2008). Auction mechanism is also very important since it is 
market clearing mechanism that equates supply and demand. In auctions price 
formation is explicit, i.e. the rules that determine price formation are well known to all 
parties involved. This paper provided a theoretical insight how bids are formed in 
symmetric auctions case, in the three types of auctions FPA, SPA, APA.  
 
Appendix 1. Distributions in Auction solver software 
Standard Normal distribution function  
In this case Φ is cumulative distribution, than standard normal function with CDF 
 (Φ(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋
∫ 𝑒
−(𝑧)2
2
⁄𝑥
−∞
𝑑𝑧 and 𝑧 =
𝑥−𝜇
𝜎
   z is standardized normal value ;in this case 
of standard normal distribution z=x) given as : 
F(x) =
Φ (
x − μ
σ ) − Φ (
a − μ
σ )
Φ (
b − μ
σ ) − Φ (
a − μ
σ )
 
In our case we used standard normal distribution function where 𝜔𝐿 = 0 and 𝜔𝐻 = 1 
and 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜎 = 1.So this gives : 
F(x) =
Φ (
x − 0
1 ) − Φ (
a − 0
1 )
Φ (
b − 0
1 ) − Φ (
a − 0
1 )
=
Φ(𝑥) − Φ(𝑎)
Φ(𝑏) − Φ(𝑎)
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Also 𝜔𝐿 is the lowest boundary of support where F=0 , and 𝜔𝐻 is the highest boundary 
of support where F=1.   Also, F(x) this is a cumulative function of a distribution .This 
CDF should be differentiable and strictly increasing  function on some interval (𝜔𝐿, 𝜔𝐻) 
is a subset form points in the interval [0, ∞].And, 𝑓(𝑥) is the probability density function 
of a distribution, that is derivative of cumulative distribution function 𝑓 = 𝐹′ . 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝜎 𝜙 (
x − μ
σ )
Φ (
ω − μ
σ ) − Φ (
−μ
σ )
 
since in our case 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜎 = 1 we can simplify the previous expression as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝜙(x)
Φ(ω)
 
Inverse function of the CDF is given as: 
𝐹−1(𝑥) = 𝜇 + 𝜎Φ−1 (𝑥 [(
b−μ
σ
) − Φ (
a−μ
σ
)] + Φ (
a−μ
σ
))    or in our case: 
𝐹−1(𝑥) = Φ−1(𝑥[(b) − Φ(a)] + Φ(a)) 
Log normal distribution  
In this distribution 𝜇 is a location parameter and it should be > 0 , and  𝜎 > 0 this is a 
scale parameter, and 𝑎 and 𝑏  parameters should be points drawn as subset for the 
set of real numbers 
[𝑎, 𝑏] ⊆ 𝑅, than CDF of the function would be: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
∫
1
𝑧𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2 (
𝑙𝑛𝑧 − 𝜇
𝜎 )
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑥
𝑎
∫
1
𝑧𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2 (
𝑙𝑛𝑧 − 𝜇
𝜎 )
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑏
𝑎
 
in our case  𝜇 = 0 but 𝜎 = 0.5 so the last expression can be simplified as: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
∫
1
𝑧 ∗ 0.5√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2 (
𝑙𝑛𝑧
0.5)
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑥
𝑎
∫
1
𝑧 ∗ 0.5√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2 (
𝑙𝑛𝑧
0.5)
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑏
𝑎
 
And the probability density function given as: 
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𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑥𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝[−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑥−𝜇
𝜎
)
2
]
∫
1
𝑧𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝[−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑧−𝜇
𝜎
)
2
]𝑑𝑧
𝑏
𝑎
 or in our case: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑥𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝[−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑥
0.5
)
2
]
∫
1
𝑧∗0.5√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝[−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑥
0.5
)
2
]𝑑𝑧
𝑏
𝑎
   and z=x also could be simplified in the last expression.  
Beta distribution  
In the Beta distribution it should be  𝛼, 𝛽 > 0 so in our case 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1 (uniform 
distribution) our distribution support values between 0 and 1, 
support=[0.000,1.000].The Beta function is a power function on x and its reflection 1-
x , and it is defined as: 
𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏) = ∫ 𝑥𝑎−1
1
0
(1 − 𝑥)𝑏−1𝑑𝑥; 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0, 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1 
And CDF of this function can be written as: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
1
𝐵(𝑎,𝑏)
∫ 𝑥𝑎−1 ∗ (1 − 𝑥)𝑏−1𝑑𝑥;    
𝜐(𝑥)
𝜔𝐿
  where 𝜐(𝑥) =
𝑥−𝜔𝐿
𝜔𝐻−𝜔𝐿
 
PDF of the function is given as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿
𝜐(𝑥)𝑎−1(1 − 𝜈(𝑥))𝑏−1
𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏)
 
With 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1 our Beta distribution turns into standard uniform distribution  
1
𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏)
𝑥𝑎−1(1 − 𝑥)𝑏−1 
Uniform distribution  
In the uniform distribution 𝜔𝐻 > 𝜔𝐿 ≥ 0 and in our case this distributions is supported 
in the range [0,1].Cumulative distribution function for uniform distribution is given as: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
𝑥 − 𝜔𝐿
𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿
 
Probability distribution function is given as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿
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Inverse function is given as: 
𝐹−1(𝑥) = 𝜔𝐿 + 𝑥[𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿] 
Triangular distribution  
In our case in the triangular distribution parameters were set as follows: 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1, 
and 𝑐 = 0.5.Requirement here is that 𝑎 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑏.Also 𝜓 ∈ [0,1]  this is parameter of 
uniformity (vertex-common endpoint of two or more rays of line segments). In our case 
𝜓 = 0.  
Cumulative distribution function here is: 
𝐹(𝑋) = 𝜓𝑥 + (1 − 𝜓)
(𝑥−𝑎)2
(𝑏−𝑎)(𝑐−𝑎)
        for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑐)  or 
𝐹(𝑋) = 𝜓𝑥 + (1 − 𝜓) [1 −
(𝑏−𝑥)2
(𝑏−𝑎)(𝑏−𝑐)
]  for 𝑥 ∈ [𝑐, 𝑏) 
In our case since 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1, and 𝑐 = 0.5 this  distribution is a distribution of 𝑥 =
(𝑥1+𝑥2)
2
, 𝑥1and 𝑥2 are two independent random variables. So previous expression in 
our case would become: 
𝐹(0,…,0.5)(𝑋) =
(𝑥)2
(0.5)
= 2𝑥2             if 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1/2        or   𝐹(0.5,1−0,0.5)(𝑋) = 1 −
(1−𝑥)2
0.5
=
(2𝑥 − 1)2  and for the part 1/2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1 it becomes 𝐹(0.5,…,1)(𝑋) = 1 −
(1−𝑥)2
0.5
=
2𝑥2 − (2𝑥 − 1)2 
𝐹(𝑥) = {
(𝑥)2
(0.5)
= 2𝑥2   𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ (0, … ,0,5) 
2𝑥2 − (2𝑥 − 1)2 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 ∈ (0.5, … ,1)
 
4x-(4x 
Probability distribution function or PDF is a first derivative of the CDF so  
 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐹′(𝑥) = {
4𝑥  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ (0, … ,0,5)
4 − 4𝑥 𝑖𝑓  𝑥 ∈ (0.5, … ,1)
 
 
26 
 
Kumaraswamy or double bounded distribution  
In our case for Kumaraswamy distribution lower and upper bound are 𝜔𝐿 = 0 and 
𝜔𝐻 = 1 and  
𝛼 = 𝛽 = 2. Requirement fulfilled here is that 𝛼, 𝛽 > 0, and 𝜔𝐿 , 𝜔𝐻 ⊆ ℝ+.The CDF of 
the Kumaraswamy distribution is defined as: 
𝐹(𝑥; 𝑎; 𝑏) = 1−(1 − 𝑥𝑎)𝑏 
And the probability density function is a first derivative of the previous expression: 
𝑓(𝑥; 𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝐹′(𝑥; 𝑎; 𝑏) = 𝑎𝑏𝑥𝑎−1(1 − 𝑥𝑎)𝑏−1   , for 𝑥 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛼, 𝛽 > 0 
Gamma distribution  
In our case shape parameter in this distribution 𝑘 = 0.5 and scale parameter 𝜃 = 1 
and 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1 so distribution support is support = [0.000,1.000]. The Gamma 
function is defined as: 
Γ(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑥𝑘−1𝑒−𝑥
∞
0
𝑑𝑥;  𝑘 ∈ (0, ∞)  (this is also called lower incomplete Gamma 
function) 
CDF of Gamma distribution is given as: 
𝐹(𝑋) =
Γ(𝑘,
𝑥
𝑏
)
Γ(𝑘)
𝑥 ∈ (0, ∞)  or CDF is given as 
𝐹(𝑥) =
∫ 𝑥𝑘−1𝑒−𝑥
∞
0
𝑑𝑥
Γ(𝑘)
 
While the probability density function is given as : 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝜃𝑘Γ(𝑘)
𝑥𝑘−1𝑒−
𝑥
𝜃 
Or in terms of shape parameter k and scale parameter b, PDF of Gamma distribution 
can be written as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑏𝑘Γ(𝑘)
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [(𝑘 − 1) ln(𝑥) −
1
𝑏
𝑥] 𝑥 ∈ (0, ∞)    or if we simplify: 
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𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑏𝑘Γ(𝑘)
∗ 𝑥𝑘−1 ∗ 𝑒−
𝑥
𝑏  in our case where k=0.5, b=1 the last expression would 
become: 
First Γ (
1
2
) = √𝜋 = √3.1416 = 1.7725 ≈ 1.8 
𝑓(𝑥) = 1.8 ∗
1
√𝑥
∗ 𝑒−𝑥 = 1.8 ∗
1
√𝑥
∗
1
𝑒𝑥
=
1.8
𝑒𝑥 ∗ √𝑥
 
 
Weibull distribution  
This is continuous probability distribution. In our case 𝜔𝐿 = 0 and 𝜔𝐻 = 1 and 𝑘 = 1 
which means that the failure rate is constant over time, and 𝜆 = 1 this is the scale 
parameter .And after the Rayleigh distribution 𝜆 = √2𝜎 since in our case 𝜆 = 1√2𝜎 =
1 and = 1/2 . Cumulative distribution function of Weibull distribution is given as: 
𝐹(𝑥, 𝑘, 𝜆) = 1 − 𝑒−(
𝑥
𝜆
)𝑘
  or alternatively  
𝐹(𝑥) =
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [− (
𝑥 − 𝜔𝐿
𝜆 )
𝑘
]
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [− (
𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿
𝜆 )
𝑘
]
 
Probability density function is given as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝑘
𝜆𝑘
(𝑥 − 𝜔𝐿)
𝑘−1 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [− (
𝑥 − 𝜔𝐿
𝜆 )
𝑘
]
1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [− (
𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿
𝜆 )
𝑘
]
 
Uniform distribution   
This distribution is 𝑈(𝑎, 𝑏) in our case a=0, b=1, this are minimal and maximal value. 
This distribution supports  𝑏 ≥ 𝑎 ≥ 0. 
So CDF of a uniform distribution is: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎
𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏 
PDF of uniform distribution is given as: 
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𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑏 − 𝑎
 
 
Power distribution  
This is distribution that is frequently used to model income, financial variables and 
others. In our case 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1, 𝛼 = 0.5 .CDF of this distribution16 is given as: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
𝜂
𝛼 + 1
[(𝑥 + 𝑎 + 𝑐)𝛼+1 − 𝑐𝑎∓1] 
PDF of this distribution is given as: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜂 (𝑥 + 𝑎 + 𝑐)𝛼 
In the previous expressions 𝜂 = (𝛼 + 1)[(𝑥 − 𝑎 + 𝑐)𝛼+1 − 𝑐𝑎+1]−1 
Reverse power distribution  
Parameters are the same as in power distribution namely = 0, 𝑏 = 1, 𝛼 = 0.5 . And 
also [𝑎, 𝑏] ⊆ ℝ+, and 𝛼 ≥ 0 this is a shape parameter.  
CDF of this probability distribution is given as: 
𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − (
𝑏 − 𝑥
𝑏 − 𝑎
)
𝛼
 
PDF of this distribution is given as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝛼(𝑏 − 𝑥)𝛼−1
𝑏 − 𝑎
 
Exponential distribution  
In our case parameters are set as 𝜔𝐿 = 0 and 𝜔𝐻 = 1 and 𝜆 = 0.5 .CDF of this 
probability distribution is given as: 
𝐹(𝑥) =
1 − exp (−𝜆(𝑥 − 𝜔𝐿)
1 − exp (−𝜆(𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿)
 
                                                          
16See, Katzwer (2011) 
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PDF of this distribution is given as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝜆exp (−𝜆(𝑥 − 𝜔𝐿)
1 − exp (−𝜆(𝜔𝐻 − 𝜔𝐿)
 
 
Appendix Parametrized distributions in auction solver  
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